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Ron Beadle and Geoff Moore 
  
Introduction 
Ron Beadle and Geoff Moore 
 
Most who discover the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre do so second-hand, through 
their own discipline rather than his. This book is designed for such readers. Although there is 
a large secondary literature on MacIntyre, most of it sits within disciplines;1 this book is an 
attempt to cast the net more widely. We wanted to compile a text that would introduce the 
way in which MacIntyre speaks to different traditions and to different disciplines—the kind 
of book that we would find useful as scholars who themselves work in a particular discipline. 
We were both teaching in Newcastle Business School, UK in the late 1990s, when we 
found to our surprise that we had each been reading Alasdair MacIntyre. We eagerly began to 
talk about how his work reframed our understanding of the workplace, and later to write 
about this and to write to him, asking for clarifications and to see what might have gone 
wrong with our own arguments. We did not always agree with each other or with him, but we 
knew that his theses could transform the way in which work organizations are understood. 
In the mid-2000s we organised a symposium at Durham University in which 
philosophers, sociologists and business ethicists discussed his work. Unbeknown to us, 
Kelvin Knight was already organizing a much more significant event at London Metropolitan 
University. And so in 2007 over 100 scholars met for a conference in London opened by 
MacIntyre himself. The conference attracted Marxists who had known MacIntyre as a 
comrade in the 1960s, Thomistic Catholics who has known him as a profound influence from 
the 1980s onward, and others who knew little or nothing of these allegiances. Arguments 
were had, discoveries made, late nights were the norm and a sense of amazement at the 
breadth of his influence was evident just from looking around the room.  
                                                          
1 Recent examples include Hannan, Ethics under Capital and Moore, Virtue at Work. 
MacIntyre had brought together people who would never normally encounter one 
another, and a level of intellectual energy and excitement resulted that was incomparable to 
the disciplinary conferences to which we were all used. On their return to the United States, 
Christopher Lutz, Thomas Osborne and Jeff Nicholas decided that this event had to be 
repeated, in part to attract many American scholars who been unable to attend the London 
conference. In 2008, this second conference took place in the St Meinrad Seminary and 
School of Theology, Indiana. The noted theologian Stanley Hauerwas was a keynote speaker. 
For doctoral students working with MacIntyre’s ideas, and even a small number of 
undergraduates who attended such as Caleb Bernacchio, these conferences provided 
opportunities to test ideas and encounter others working with similar issues in different 
disciplines and different traditions. 
The International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry (ISME)2 formalised the 
developing project to create opportunities for such dialogue to continue. Jim Kelly arranged 
for his Law students at Notre Dame to see us through incorporation as an educational charity 
based in Indiana. We have subsequently held conferences in Dublin, Vilnius, Providence, 
Nottingham, Grand Rapids, Athens, St Louis, Wroclaw, Paris and Durham UK, as well as 
contributing panels at other academic events. A range of publications has emerged from this 
work, alongside an online presence, active social media and hundreds of members across the 
globe.   
The royalties from this volume will go to the Society but, more importantly, our aim 
is to enable some of the flavour of our work to become available to people who cannot attend 
these conferences. We are keenly aware of our own privilege, that our conferences 
overwhelmingly attract scholars and research students from Europe and North America who 
have institutional support to attend. Whilst events in Australia and a planned conference in 
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South America will extend our reach, we understand that scholars and students elsewhere 
find it difficult to join us in person. In seeking a publisher for this project our principal 
criterion was to produce a volume that would be accessible and priced at a level that such 
scholars and students could afford. We are enormously grateful to Wipf and Stock whose 
commitment to this matched our ambition, and to Stanley Hauerwas who recommended them 
to us. Although we had not anticipated it, one feature of this volume is contributors’ regular 
use of texts and lectures by MacIntyre that are not easily available. This enables arguments to 
be considered that readers only familiar with MacIntyre’s books and collections are unlikely 
to have encountered. 
Our contributors share an understanding that, whilst the products of the work carry 
their own names, they should be understood as common goods—they could not have been 
achieved without ongoing dialogue and constrained dispute between scholars. In this spirit 
we challenged our contributors to write about MacIntyre in the context of their own tradition 
or discipline. They have responded in a variety of ways—some focus on how MacIntyre’s 
work has been taken up, challenged and developed in their disciplines (Beabout, Dunne, 
Fritz), others about what his work means for practice (especially Kelly), some about what 
should be but has not yet been learned from him (Osborne, Angier, McMylor, Blackledge and 
Korkut Raptis), others show both what has been learned and what has not (Bernacchio and 
Knight, Malakos, McMylor), and finally some explore how his work integrates material from 
different disciplines and thereby encourage readers to consider their relationships (Hauerwas, 
Lear, Nicholas).   
Peter McMylor advised one of us before we first met Alasdair MacIntyre in person, 
that the last thing he wants is fawning admiration. This was wise guidance from the first 
person to have written his intellectual biography.3  Contributors to this volume have sought to 
                                                          
3 McMylor, MacIntyre. 
summarise MacIntyre’s work, to consider how we have and should learn from it, but also to 
challenge him; and this is how he would want it. It is not by accident that in each of his 
volumes MacIntyre thanks participants in symposia that have considered particular arguments 
and chapters.4 In such exchanges, some of which we have been fortunate enough to attend, he 
considers challenges, refines his theses, develops his arguments and anticipates objections.    
To engage in such exchanges well, to learn that all-too-difficult virtue of being 
genuinely grateful for correction, to be robust in our defences and to identify incoherence, 
poor argumentation or weak evidence, requires both us and our interlocutors to care for truth 
above all. It requires us to observe an ethics of enquiry that necessitates listening with care, to 
persevere with difficult ideas and to judge fairly; in other words, to observe the precepts of 
natural law.  
Such forms of deliberative and shared reasoning must be at least as cross-disciplinary 
as the subjects they consider, and amongst MacIntyre’s hallmarks as a philosopher is his 
deployment of arguments and evidence from sociology, history, psychology and many others. 
Excessive disciplinary divisions and early specialization prevents scholars from encountering 
and working with those from other disciplines and traditions. As a result, we are likely to see 
parts of our own traditions and disciplines clearly, but others poorly. When challenged by 
critics from another tradition, we may have few sound defences to make. The decline in 
theistic belief has, for example, involved the failure of theists to defend their positions against 
critics, particularly natural scientists. Were they to understand the recent findings of natural 
science better then they would be able to engage with such critics on more equal terms.5 
                                                          
4 For example MacIntyre, After Virtue, xviii–xix., MacIntyre Three Rival Versions, ix., MacIntyre, Ethics in the 
Conflicts of Modernity, xii. 
5 MacIntyre made this argument in remarks to a Symposium at The De Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at 
Notre Dame on his volume God, Philosophy, Universities. This can be found online: MacIntyre, “Comments on 
God, Philosophy, and Universities,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCwKdkW6-lw from 1:32:35. 
Where theology and philosophy once integrated scholarly understanding so that 
different elements of our disciplinary learning could be contextualised within wider 
commitments, contemporary scholars now have to do this work for themselves, or else fall 
into an incoherence which is either not recognised or, if it is, may appear inevitable. But this 
is not inevitable and the engagements that MacIntyreans have undertaken with one another, in 
part to overcome these very limitations, have also and happily meant that we have become 
one another’s teachers, students and friends. This volume is above all an attempt to capture 
that spirit of enquiry, to encourage scholars working with MacIntyre’s theses to look up from 
their disciplinary microscopes, if not to seek a telescope, at least to seek some perspective. 
The chapters that follow have been at our invitation, as we sought scholars who could 
consider MacIntyre’s work in the context of their own disciplines and traditions. There is one 
exception, however. We invited Christopher Lutz to write an intellectual biography to 
navigate the development of MacIntyre’s thinking over time. As Lutz argues elsewhere6  
MacIntyre’s own history embodies the argument that to be rational requires us to give our 
allegiance to whichever tradition best refutes the arguments made against it. Since his 
conversion to Catholicism in the late 1980s, MacIntyre has argued that this tradition is 
Thomistic Aristotelianism, but in a form that bears the influence of Marx above anyone else.  
Reading MacIntyre’s earlier work without understanding his subsequent conversions is liable 
to lead to interpretive error and Lutz’s opening chapter provides an antidote. Lutz’s central 
claim is that a continuity of purpose in his understanding of moral philosophy provides a 
narrative unity despite the changes in MacIntyre’s allegiances: “Moral philosophy, for 
MacIntyre, would be a study of practical reasoning and of the habits of judgment that 
Aristotelians associate with the virtue of prudence.”  
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Chapter 2 is a revised version of Stanley Hauerwas’s keynote address “God and 
Alasdair MacIntyre” to the 2018 ISME Conference at Durham, UK. In “MacIntyre and 
Theology,” Hauerwas considers MacIntyre’s philosophical arguments for Christianity but 
finds his distinction between philosophy and theology to be both unconvincing and, perhaps 
more importantly, in conflict with Aquinas. Despite this he concludes that, “We might like 
him to do more, but we should not complain because he has given us more than most 
contemporary philosophers think possible.” 
In Chapter 3, Thomas Osborne takes up MacIntyre’s relationship to Thomism more 
widely. His focus is on what Thomists should have learned from MacIntyre but so far have 
not. In particular, Osborne urges Thomists to engage with MacIntyre’s largely sociological 
account of moral disagreement, one that challenges Aquinas himself but does not involve a 
denial of fundamental Thomistic positions. He argues: “Learning from MacIntyre that moral 
judgments are in a way embedded in practices and social roles does not remove moral 
judgments from the scope of rational evaluation. But it does show that the rational evaluation 
of moral norms has implications not only for moral theory but also for practice.” 
In Chapter 4, Tolis Malakos considers MacIntyre within the context of contemporary 
moral philosophy. He argues that MacIntyre’s influence in the rejection of the once popular 
view that there are no rational foundations for ethics and morality has been sadly overlooked.  
By contrast to Lutz’s account of the coherence of MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism in 
this volume however, Malakos suggests a tension between MacIntyre’s critique of the 
Enlightenment and his arguments for the universality of natural law. He argues that, “a 
considerable degree of tension and conflict can be now discerned both in his positive account 
of practical rationality and action, and in his critique of some of the Enlightenment projects.” 
In Chapter 5, Tom Angier argues for the singular importance of MacIntyre’s own 
learning as a classicist to understanding the continuity of his mature arguments, and casts him 
as a Platonizing Aristotelian. Noting how “Uncovering and unpacking this continuity, 
however, is not a straightforward task,” his method involves a forensic examination of 
MacIntyre’s key texts, one that allows him to develop the novel conclusion that, “whereas 
After Virtue casts Aristotelianism as the antidote to the moral and moral philosophical failure 
of the “Enlightenment Project,” Whose Justice? Which Rationality? casts Aristotle as the 
antidote to the political philosophical failure of Plato.” 
In Chapter 6, Caleb Bernacchio and Kelvin Knight outline MacIntyre’s political 
vision, and contrast its Aristotelian focus on politics as a purposive and inclusive activity 
concerned with the achievement of our common good with the centrality of relations between 
citizens and state in post-Enlightenment political thought. Acknowledging that MacIntyre has 
written more on politics than he has published, they consider whether this omission accounts 
for the neglect of his work by conventional political philosophy. Perhaps, however, the focus 
of his politics on local political action might bear a greater responsibility.  Bernacchio and 
Knight summarise this dramatically: “But what is clear, given the importance of the public 
goods provided by the state for the flourishing of local communities, and the irrationality and 
absence of rational enquiry in many state decisions concerning the allocation of resources, is 
that it is only through conflict—with the state or its many agencies, or often with the large 
corporations closely aligned with it—that local communities can flourish.” 
In Chapter 7, Paul Blackledge and Buket Korkut Raptis take up MacIntyre’s radical 
politics in relation to his Marxist roots. They argue that including MacIntyre with other post 
Marxists who turned to ethics may lie at the root of his neglect but that, “while he searched 
for a justifiable basis for resistance to capitalism, his focus was on the forms of practice that 
might underpin this alternative rather than the abstract norm through which it might be 
articulated.” Unlike Angier who points to MacIntyre’s roots in classical philosophy, or Lutz, 
who argues that the relationship between moral philosophy and practical rationality is the 
abiding feature of MacIntyre’s work, Blackledge and Korkut Raptis maintain that, “the 
strongest elements of MacIntyre’s mature thought stem from the Aristotelian Marxism of his 
youth.” 
In Chapter 8, Jeffery Nicholas pursues MacIntyre’s relationship to a specific offshoot 
of Marxism, namely Frankfurt School Critical Theory. Despite MacIntyre’s notorious attack 
on Herbert Marcuse,7 that leading light of the Frankfurt School, Nicholas argues that 
MacIntyre’s critique of capitalism and Frankfurt School ethics have much to learn from each 
other: “both traditions share a common cause of ending suffering and developing a society 
free of capitalist inhumanity. That more dialogue has not occurred is a sadness, but one which 
opens up the possibility of common research programs and solidarity in the task of making 
the world a place suited for human flourishing.” 
In Chapter 9, Janie Harden Fritz carefully traces MacIntyre’s influence on the 
development of communication ethics, communication theory and the philosophy of 
communication. She claims: “In each area, his treatment of narrative and tradition as a 
ground for ethics, as well as the concept of practices emerging from and supporting 
traditions, appeals to an action-oriented, meaning-centered understanding of human 
communicative life.” A key focus of this chapter is on the agenda-setting potential of 
MacIntyre’s work in such developing areas as communication and religion, journalism and 
new media. 
In Chapter 10, Greg Beabout narrates another field in which MacIntyre has, perhaps 
surprisingly, enjoyed a sustained influence, business ethics. Beabout locates these 
developments in the wider growth of business ethics from the 1980s onwards and traces the 
debates that the interest in his work has spurred. These include the relationship between 
practices and institutions, the role of the manager, and the virtue of practical wisdom. 
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In Chapter 11, Peter McMylor casts MacIntyre as a singularly sociological 
philosopher, one whose claims for the intimacy of the relationship between these disciplines 
sets him apart from the analytical and phenomenological traditions which have dominated 
sociology in the late twentieth century. McMylor argues that MacIntyre “can best be viewed 
as belonging to a form of scholarship that can be understood not by adopting the popular term 
‘interdisciplinary,’ but rather by that of  ‘post-disciplinary.’” Echoing some of Osborne’s 
arguments as to why Thomists need to pay more attention to MacIntyre’s sociology, 
McMylor commends MacIntyre’s argument that structural constraints and socially embedded 
decision-making processes are critical to understanding limitations on moral agency. 
Alongside the arguments of Fritz and Beabout, McMylor sees MacIntyre’s main influence as 
deriving from his notion of narrative, of the relationship between practices and institutions, 
and of the relationship between goods and practices within cultural sociology. 
In Chapter 12, Joseph Dunne revises his 2018 keynote address to the ISME 
Conference in Durham, UK  that highlights MacIntyre’s ongoing attempt to understand how 
best to from particular thinkers and texts. Dunne outlines his task as: “I follow his own 
example, then—doing unto him what he has done unto others—in asking what can we learn 
from MacIntyre; more specifically, what can we learn from him about learning itself?” His 
chapter considers MacIntyre’s remarks on learning throughout his career considering how we 
learn through childhood, through practices, and through engagement in ethics and politics. 
Anticipating Hauerwas, Dunne characterizes MacIntyre’s distinction between philosophy and 
theology as an example of the very compartmentalization that he criticizes elsewhere, and 
one indeed that renders the central notion of a “final end” opaque in MacIntyre’s work. 
Perhaps more pointedly, anticipating Lear, Dunne emphasizes the role of human fallibility in 
MacIntyre’s work as both condition for and limitation of our learning, and points to the need 
for an expansion of the second person-perspective in MacIntyrean enquiry, especially in 
respect of relationships which involve pedagogy and relationships involving love. Such a 
perspective is essential if we are to address the first person weaknesses to which we all are 
prone. 
Jim Kelly opens Chapter 13 with a memorable phrase: “The law now has little to do 
with justice. Like a couple in a long, unhappy marriage, they spend a lot of time together but 
rarely actually talk with one another.” However, rather than pursue a natural law critique of 
positive law, his essay goes on to provide an account of what justice and law would look like 
in the type of practice-based community that MacIntyre commends. Whilst providing 
commendable levels of detail as to how the law might be used to create housing trusts that 
would enable such communities to develop, it is critical to see the role of law as facilitative 
rather than the primary focus of enquiry. The purpose is clear: “When members of the 
community can call one another neighbors and friends, the networks of giving and receiving 
so fundamental to the achievement of common goods need not be so fragmented and isolated 
as they once were.” 
In our final chapter, Jonathan Lear offers his keynote address to the 2019 conference 
held at Notre Dame to mark Alasdair MacIntyre’s 90th Birthday. Lear, a philosopher and 
psychologist, highlights the therapeutic potential of MacIntyre’s recent work. Whereas 
Aristotle’s Ethics spoke to readers in pursuit of the good life, MacIntyre’s directs his readers 
to the ways in which lives go wrong. Both resonate with their intended audience.  
Nevertheless, Lear takes up MacIntyre on not being Aristotelian enough in denying the 
importance of happiness in human flourishing. Lear argues we need the guidance of theorists 
such as MacIntyre to put our social structures in question, but we also need good friends to 
provide the second-person perspective that Dunne highlights, and a psychoanalyst for dealing 
with the non-rational parts of our souls. 
This book is designed to be read as a whole or as the moment of interest strikes you.  
In either case, however, we hope that it helps convince you that in place of our conventional 
academic specialisation, one of the most important lessons to be learned from MacIntyre is 
the need to learn from one another.   
Any project such as this incurs a variety of debts and a long list of those to whom we 
should be, and are, grateful. This list includes our contributors, who have been generous in 
their responses to our requests, swift (mainly) in meeting our deadlines, and both thoughtful 
and erudite. A second debt is to our reviewers for taking the time to consider earlier versions 
of this text and to provide excellent suggestions. A third is to Wipf and Stock for their 
agreement to participate in this project, for their professionalism and also for their flexibility, 
care and commitment throughout. A fourth debt is to our institutions for giving us the time 
and resource to pursue this and many other projects in which we have sought to defend, 
extend and apply MacIntyre’s work. This debt is not only to our managers in the Newcastle 
and Durham University Business Schools but also to the cleaners, reception staff, 
professional support colleagues and many others without whom these institutions would not 
provide us, our colleagues and our students with the opportunity to teach, research and learn. 
A fifth debt is to the hundreds of scholars and students with whom we have discussed and 
debated these ideas and to the International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry. Our sixth debt 
is to Cumbrian artist Alison Dyer-Smith for permission to use her painting ‘The Virtues’ as 
the front cover image. Our seventh debt is of a more personal nature and due to our life 
partners, Shakuntala and Alison, who have once again exemplified the virtue of patience 
during this project.  Finally, the debt that we, alongside the other contributors to this volume, 
owe to Alasdair MacIntyre is unrepayable. The best we can do is to invite others to learn, as 
we have learned, from his remarkable body of work.  
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